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15. Economic instruments and institutional constraints:
possible schemes for
SO2 emissions trading in the EU
Olivier Godard1 2
________________________________________________________________
1. INTRODUCTION
Following the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP), two protocols on sulphur emissions have been adopted. The 1985 Helsinki Protocol
established a uniform abatement target of 30 per cent for all Parties, on the basis of 1980
emissions, while the 1994 Oslo Protocol defined new national targets for SO2 abatement,
which for the first time are differentiated across countries. The Oslo Protocol also fixed
emission standards for new sources, and agreed on the specifications of the best available
technologies to be used by operators. The agreed long term objective is to reduce SO2
emissions so as to respect critical loads
3
for acid deposition everywhere in Europe
4
. However,
the regulatory requirements agreed upon within the Protocol are insufficient to achieve this
1. Senior researcher at CNRS.
2
This paper benefits from the results of a 1996 study conducted by the author and Christine Cros, research
assistant at CIRED, for the DGII ‘Economic and Financial Affairs’ of the European Commission. See Cros and 
Godard (1998). Financial support from the French ADEME and Ministry of the Environment is also gratefully
acknowledged.
3. Critical loads are defined as the maximum levels of acid deposition below which, according to current
scientific knowledge, no significant damage to sensitive ecosystems can be demonstrated. Critical deposition for
one zone is the maximum deposition compatible with the critical loads of specific ecosystems and land use within
the zone. The 5-percentile critical loads correspond to deposition levels generating no significant damage for at
least 95 per cent of the ecosystems within the area.
4. In the context of this paper, each time a territorial dimension is implied, ‘Europe’ or ‘European’ should be 
understood as the whole European territory covered by the Oslo Protocol of the Geneva Convention, i.e.
including countries outside the EU. Quite evidently, then, EU refers to the territory of the present member
countries of the EU.
O. Godard - SO2 trading in the EU 2
long-term objective. To reduce the gap, it will be necessary to introduce new policy
instruments or significantly tightening existing ones.
The purpose of this paper is to develop possible organisational schemes for SO2
emissions trading within the EU
5
as a means of achieving a cost-effective trajectory to reach
the long run objective. Under good conditions of information and organisation, a tradable
permit system may enforce an overall environmental constraint while minimising the total
abatement cost. This is why this instrument can at the same time be viewed as bringing an
environmental and an economic improvement, when compared to administrative regulatory
approaches focused on emission rates (Klaassen, 1996). To be viable, any proposed scheme
must prove politically acceptable (distributive palatability), achieve a predictable
improvement in environmental quality (environmental effectiveness), and most importantly be
consistent with pre-existing basic rules and requirements (institutional acceptability) (Godard,
1995). The latter condition is the central issue addressed in this chapter.
The Oslo Protocol imposes one main constraint on SO2 emissions: a set of individual
national targets to be achieved at three dates in the future: 2000, 2005 and 2010. This choice
has been guided by European-wide model optimisation exercises aiming at achieving an
intermediate objective of a 60 per cent reduction in the gap between current levels of acid
deposition and the 5-percentile critical loads for each 150km by 150km ‘grid cell’ within 
Europe. The Protocol also includes a provision that two parties could be authorised to join
their abatement efforts. The detailed rules for this joint implementation concept have still to
be determined by the executive body of the Convention. It seems that any such proposal
would only be accepted if the parties can demonstrate that it will positively contribute to the
long term environmental objective, i.e. improving environmental quality in the whole territory
covered by the Convention. In the context of this paper, I have interpreted this requirement as
an implicit second constraint, one submitting any SO2 allowance trading scheme to the
obligation of meeting a percentage abatement target regarding the gap between current levels
of deposition and critical loads. The final 2010 target should be a 60 per cent reduction in this
gap. However, to avoid disequilibrium between deposition and emission constraints, the
deposition target may evolve with the same target years as the national emission ceilings. For
example, we could assume abatement objectives of 55% in 2000, 57% in 2005 and 60% in
2010.
For the design of a trading scheme, this amounts to having two constraints to satisfy:
overall national targets related to emissions; and the percentage abatement target as regards
deposition in excess of critical loads. For areas where deposition is below critical loads, the
second constraint is interpreted as ensuring critical loads are not exceeded. Beyond 2010,
more stringent objectives (say 75 per cent or 90 per cent reduction in exceedance levels) could
be adopted in a multi-phased approach.
Whatever the level chosen, there is no reason why these two types of constraints
should automatically coincide. A key feature of this paper is to address this specific issue of
satisfying two types of constraints when developing an allowance trading scheme. The joint
5. The acronym EU is also intended to cover the European Economic Community for years before the
establishment of the EU.
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implementation of the first constraint provides a global European cap on emissions, leading to
allowances that can be directly expressed in quantities of emissions. The second constraint
leads to allowances expressed in quantities of deposition by unit zone (see Box 1).
Box 1 Terminology for zones
The paper uses several definitions of geographical zones: Deposition zone is a general term for an area receiving acid deposition. Unit zones are the smallest zones for which critical loads have be determined. Under the
UNECE protocols, these correspond to 150km by 150km squares. Macro zones are a grouping of several unit zones on the basis of some rule. Trading zones are areas within which trading is freely authorised with a one to one
exchange rate. Between trading zones, trading may be forbidden or may be allowed with a
specific exchange rate (for example 1:1.5). Trading zones may correspond to individual
unit zones or a larger grouping of unit zones (a macro zone).
Two families of solutions are then considered:
 A system of two types of tradable allowances working in parallel. Firms have to gather the
same amount of the two different types of allowances to obtain a permit to emit a
corresponding amount of SO2. An integrated system in which a single allowance type embodies both emission and
deposition constraints. Two variants of an integrated system are considered which put
different emphasis on the incentive mechanisms imposed on firms and national
governments.
Such solutions may be judged rather complex to operate, more complex than those
implemented by the Acid Rain Program in the US, for example. Nevertheless, the source of
complication is to be found, not in allowance trading as such, but in the existing framework of
the LRTAP and subsequent Protocols. To achieve any further progress towards the long-term
goal it will be necessary to address the complication of the transition, whatever the policy
instrument chosen. To offer the required level of guarantee, a ‘command and control’ 
approach would have to become either excessively stringent or cumbersome. I contend that by
lowering the total cost of abatement, allowance trading may help facilitate an overall
progression towards the abatement of acid deposition, even if progress cannot be guaranteed
at the same pace for each unit zone of the European territorial grid. One major contribution of
SO2 allowance trading could be in the flexibility of timing given to the participating
companies. With tradable allowances, firms are given the opportunity to optimise the timing
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of their investment decisions. This saves capital costs and encourages the efficient and timely
adoption of technical innovations.
Approximately 65 per cent of total SO2 emissions in the EU originate from the
generation of electricity. It therefore seems quite natural to begin to implement trading
schemes within this sector so as to gain practical experience of the tool within the EU. An
opposite view would stress the low level of competition in the power generation sector, since
oligopolies or monopolies are common structures in many EU countries. However, recent EU
initiatives regarding the introduction of competition in this sector will increase the sensitivity
to price signals and market opportunities. Positive synergies may then exist between
electricity market liberalisation and allowance trading. Further extension of the trading
scheme could be advantageously envisaged to oil refineries and to all industrial combustion
plant above a certain size (e.g. 25MW).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
some key variables for the design of a trading scheme, while section 3 discusses the issue of
defining trading zones. Section 4 presents a system of two simultaneous, coupled allowance
trading mechanisms. Section 5 is devoted to an integrated scheme including an auctioned
market for ‘unusable allowances’, while section 6 describes an alternative integrated system 
incorporating compensations for member states. The main conclusions are summarised in
section 7.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF SOME KEY DESIGN VARIABLES FOR
TRADING SCHEMES
The success of a trading scheme depends crucially on the details of its design. Here, the
following variables are selected for particular attention:
 Basic agents: which parties receive allowances and participate in trade. Level of initial allocation: whether this should be carried out at a European or member
state level. Permitting procedure: how trades should be authorised to ensure that deposition
constraints are not exceeded. Exchange rate: how emissions from widely separated sources may be compared to achieve
approximate equivalence in environmental impact through trading. Periodicity: whether parties should be allowed to trade continuously or at periodic
intervals.
Figure 1 summarises the choices made for these key variables, while subsequent sections
explain these choices in more detail.
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Figure 1 Key design variables for a EU scheme of SO2 trading
Quantitative Basic Level of Permitting Rate of Periodicity
constraints agents initial procedure exchange of trades
allocation
EU sum of
nationa l
ceilings
60% reduction
of gap with
critical loads
Governments
only
Plants
only
Nationa l
European
Uniform
one to one
D ifferentia ted
according
to zones
Continuous
Periodic
Centralized
Sem icentra lized
Both
plants
and
govern
ments
Decentra lized
2.1 Who trades?
Two types of actors could legitimately participate in a trading scheme: governments and
electricity generators responsible for SO2 emissions. An international trading mechanism that
only operates between governments would leave significant opportunities for cost saving
untapped. Because they directly control emissions and have the best access to technical and
economic information, firms should be able to engage directly in a trading scheme. However a
trading scheme organised solely at the firm level would correspond to a level of political
integration which has yet to be achieved by the EU. It is EU member states which have taken
on legally binding quantitative obligations under the Oslo Protocol and any trading
arrangement must respect these obligations.
In this regard, the Oslo Protocol can be seen as a compromise between an agreement
among independent States and a more integrated approach that could be developed if all States
chose to behave as the members of a single political community. The EU context of
negotiation and decision-making also looks intermediate: a network of regular co-operative
links has been created and some acceptance of sectoral asymmetries in obligations and
burden-sharing has been institutionalised.
The political balance of this compromise is reflected in the basic constraints embodied
in the Oslo Protocol. Establishing emission ceilings on a country basis is a response to the first
component of the compromise. So, even for a EU wide allowance trading scheme, the initial
allocation of allowances at the plant level should be the responsibility of the individual
member states. But the preliminary drafts of the Protocol were conceived with reference to the
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second component, with the idea of an integrated optimal plan for acid deposition for the
whole European territory concerned, a plan sensitive to the location of deposition. This would
require trading by individual sources.
These considerations lead to the choice of a two-level system, in which there is trading
at both the government level and the plant level. Governments retain responsibility for the
initial allocation of allowances to plants, together with the legal obligation to meet national
emission ceilings. The allocation should provide a predictable framework in which individual
plants can engage in trade to improve economic efficiency. Deposition constraints are
enforced by the authorisation procedures for plant-to-plant trades, which are administered by
the central authorities. These are described more fully below.
This choice is consistent with the concern for economic efficiency expressed by the
EU as well as the Oslo Protocol. From the viewpoint of the economics of information, the
potential for cost-effectiveness can only be exploited by giving appropriate incentives to
decentralised management units; that is, to those actors who can most easily obtain the
appropriate information concerning the available abatement opportunities, technologies and
costs. This is what allowance trading is intended to achieve. If governments were to be
considered as the only agents of the system, they would be unable to obtain some of the
necessary information to minimise the social cost of abatement.
2.2 Which permitting procedure?
Permitting refers to the authorisation procedure for individual plant-to-plant trades. This must
ensure that the deposition constraints are not exceeded. There are three broad options:
 A decentralized approach with free trade, i.e. without a specific authorisation procedure but
according to agreed rules. Typically, trading may only be allowed within the same
deposition zone, or between various zones on the basis of a fixed set of exchange rates. A semi-centralized approach based on physical modelling of the net impact of each
proposed trade on acid deposition in each zone. A centralized or planned approach, in which physical and economic models are used to
identify all possible beneficial trades compatible with the current target
6
. In order to be
authorised, a projected trade should fit the pre-existing list of advantageous trades.
Modelling is not used to authorise each proposal, but is used once, at the beginning of the
period, to identify transactions that would be attractive and compatible.
Here, I suggest that a semi-centralised permitting system is the best option. The integrated
assessment models used during negotiation of the Oslo Protocol combine physical modelling
of the emission, transportation and deposition of pollutants with economic modelling of
6 This approach has been advocated by van Ierland et al. (1994).
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abatement technologies and costs. However, since the cost functions used in the models are
based on national aggregate values, the economic information is insufficient to identify the
best opportunities for minimising abatement costs. This undermines the case for centralised
permitting procedures. Instead, it is suggested that the economic part of the modelling
exercise is put aside, leaving only the physical models of emission, transportation and
deposition of pollutants together with the link between deposition and critical loads. The
economic dimension of the allocation will be left to the decentralised calculations of
individual sources. Sources will have to compute their own strategy and look for cost effective
opportunities to trade.
In this case, the process is as follows:
 the Secretariat enters the distribution of all the allowances resulting from the
national implementation of emission ceilings and technological standards into the
physical assessment models; after a search period, two sources interested in trading find each other and agree on
a trade proposal; they submit it to the Secretariat; the projected change in the location of emissions is entered in the agreed models
which are run to provide forecasts about the environmental impacts for each
deposition zone; if the project violates the second condition related to the progress towards critical
loads, it is not permitted; otherwise it is accepted.
Apart from the administrative burden, this procedure based on bilateral trades may also
not lead to a cost-effective allocation. The sequential order of trades would be very important
indeed
7
. Whether a transaction is allowed or not may depend on whether or not it is proposed
before some other transaction. However, trading can be seen as inducing Pareto
improvements, provided third parties are not significantly affected. On the whole the initial
allocation will be improved, if not made wholly cost-effective.
2.3 The exchange rate
The environmental impact of SO2 emissions depends on the location of source and receptor.
Hence, ‘one unit increase from one source cannot be offset by one unit decrease from another 
7. Linear programming models of least cost solutions implicitly assume that trading takes place in a multilateral
simultaneous manner. In the real world, trading involves individual transactions occurring sequentially. The
models may assume patterns of trade that may be impossible in reality. For example, a bilateral trade between
two sources may result in target deposition being exceeded at a particular location, but this in turn may be offset
by an additional trade with another source. Such a trading pattern would be allowed in the model but disallowed
in reality as pollution targets are (temporarily) exceeded. The models may therefore overestimate the potential
gains from trade. For a fuller discussion of this issue see Atkinson & Tietenberg (1991).
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source. The exchange rate, also termed the offset rate, may be greater or smaller than one’ 
(Førsund and Nævdal, 1994). The design of a trading scheme must respect this if it is to be
compatible with deposition constraints. Two options are possible:
 to accept trading between trading zones on the basis of exchange rates fixed for the whole
period. to refuse trading between trading zones, but to define trading zones as covering a large
geographical area so as to offer wider trading opportunities and limit transaction and
administrative costs.
In the first case, exchange rates should reflect the relative intensity of the marginal
damage generated by one unit of emissions. However, it is difficult to find a workable rule
that is able to reflect this requirement. First, marginal damage functions are not known and
some proxy has to be used. Second, while a practical rule should keep its value through time,
the conditions for optimality require a revision of exchange rates after each trade. Since
emissions are concentrated in a limited number of sources, individual trades will generally
have a non-negligible impact on the distribution of acid deposition. But continual adjustment
of exchange rates would make trading unpredictable for agents, significantly complicate
investment decisions and be administratively impractical.
The second solution sticks to a one to one exchange rate within trading zones
considered to be homogeneous. This simple and robust approach may be viewed as more
accessible, and easy to implement, being less dependent on central modelling and revision of
information. However, it is not totally satisfying since the supposed homogeneity of each zone
is an artificial construct to some extent.
The choice between these depends on both political judgement about the level of
environmental guarantees offered and administrative practicality. Most proposals have
explored exchange rates
8
, without giving too much attention to guarantees of environmental
improvement. Here we explore the second option as it may provide a higher level of
guarantee. The key issue then becomes the size of the trading zone and the trade off this
implies between environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. This is discussed
further in Section 3.
2.4 Which periodicity?
The issue here is whether agents should be allowed to trade continuously or whether trades
should take place periodically through an organised mechanism. This is relevant at two levels:
government-to-government trading and plant-to-plant trading. The best solution will depend
upon the level.
8. For an allowance trading scheme based on exchange rates, see Amann et al. (1994).
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With a two-level system of allowance trading, governments will trade on the basis of
their national caps; once national caps have been decentralised to plants, the latter will trade
together at the EU level. The intergovernmental market controlling the level of national caps
should be made highly predictable for plants, in order to ensure the security of the allowances
they receive from public authorities, and to allow them to engage in rational investment
strategies. A clear means of providing this predictability would be to organise a discrete,
periodic intergovernmental market (every 4 years, for instance), with advance transactions, i.e.
transactions having effect some years later (say 3 years). This would mean that basic plants
can move in a predictable institutional environment, with a secure horizon in the range of 3 to
7 years. For plant level trading the period could be much shorter - every six months or a year
for example.
An alternative approach would be for governments to regulate the total quotas given to
plants on a continuous base, as active operators on national markets. However, this approach
could introduce instability and unpredictability into the market, or raise the fear that
governments will behave in an arbitrary manner. These factors may turn out to be an obstacle
to technological innovation, when the weight and sunk costs of industrial investments in
desulphurisation equipment are taken into account.
3. ABOUT ZONINGAND SCALING
The issue of zoning is a key one for the practicability of the trading schemes considered in this
paper. The first problem to be addressed concerns the scale of trading zones, while the second
concerns the criteria by which zones are defined.
At one extreme, we have grid-cells, i.e. relatively small territorial units of 150km by
150km. At the other extreme, we face one unique zone, the European territory covered by the
LRTAP Convention. If trading is confined to specific zones, then larger scales provide more
opportunities for improving economic efficiency, but this is achieved at the expense of lower
levels of environmental security. Smaller scales offer greater environmental security but with
fewer opportunities for profitable trade. Maintaining practical viability with sufficient
potential for economic efficiency gains should be the relevant criteria for selecting the ‘best’ 
scale, not just having a complete guarantee about the environmental protection of every small
part of the European territory. In this latter case, too much would be paid for environmental
certainty. But how can we proceed in this direction? If the existing grid of 150km by 150km is
to be used for trading, then allowing trade between all zones using a matrix of exchange rates
is inescapable if sufficient flexibility is to be achieved. But this solution would not avoid hot
spots and, if the exchange rates remain fixed, it would not provide the expected environmental
guarantees. From this, it may seem preferable to stick to a one to one rate of exchange within
homogeneous zones. This alternative requires the definition of a limited number of macro
zones to give sources a sufficient margin of flexibility.
There are two main possibilities for defining such macro zones. The first consists in
establishing a number of categories of exceedance of critical loads and to map the European
territory according to these categories. In this case, two territorial units belonging to the same
categories may not be adjacent. Allowing a one to one exchange rate within each equivalence
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class is appealing, since emissions will have a broadly similar effect on the environment.
However, the risk of having hot-spots with an unduly large concentration of pollutants in
some places cannot be excluded. Therefore it may be useful and prudent to introduce some
additional restriction.
This may be provided by an alternative way of designing zoning - identifying
homogeneous geographical zones; that is, zones having a geographical unity in terms of
contiguity and at the same time the same broad level of excess deposition over critical loads.
Several adjacent cells with similar sensitivity to deposition could be joined in a single macro
zone. Such a grouping extends the trading possibilities between deposition allowances. Trades
would only be allowed between sources having emissions falling in the same macro zone.
Such a grouping can be made revisable. Since the ultimate target is formulated in
terms of respecting critical loads for each basic unit zone, progress in that direction may be
supported by a transitional approach to the scaling of trading zones. The initial step would be
organised on the basis of a limited number of macro zones. Such macro zones would not
constrain sources enough to ensure everywhere compliance with critical loads targets. At later
stages, these zones could be scaled-down.
One critical point for the dynamics of scaling from an incentive viewpoint is that the
future evolution of the grid should be communicated to participants well in advance so that
they can develop strategic compliance plans incorporating early adaptation. Otherwise the
outcome could be very inefficient. For instance, mistakes in capital investment might be
induced. The authorities might therefore announce that the existing zones would be narrowed
five years later, and then again ten years later. Such announcements of changes in the scale of
trading zones will limit the problem of hot spots from the start, because for every decision
having a medium or long term time horizon, specifically for planning investments
(desulphurisation equipment, etc.), plant operators will have to take into account the
announced changes. By the end of the process the long run targets fixed by the Oslo Protocol,
i.e. respecting critical loads at the level of the grid-cell, will have to be met and this will give
much less scope for trading.
With respect to practical matters, what type of zoning may reasonably be considered
for an initial step? It seems that defining five trading macro zones in which critical loads are
exceeded may make sense on both economic and ecological grounds. A recommendation
proposed by Bailey, Gough and Millock (1994) considers such a grouping of unit zones
having adjacent sensitivity. Five classes of acid sensitivity are used by them to classify each
grid cell and achieve groupings accordingly.
Such a ‘sensitivity’ classification is not completely satisfying. Two areas being
classified in the same sensitivity class may suffer unequal damage due to different levels of
deposition: marginal damage not only depends on sensitivity levels but also on basic
deposition received by zones in excess of critical loads. This is the reason why I suggest
consideration of another type of zoning based on excess deposition over critical loads. With
five classes of excess deposition, five critical macro-zones can be distinguished; they are
surrounded by large areas where critical loads are not exceeded (see the Figures 2 and 3).
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This mapping convincingly shows that drawing macro zones is not an entirely arbitrary
exercise. By accepting some kind of ‘sacrifice’9 for a few cells, it is possible to identify
homogeneous zones of a large scale. Meanwhile, significant areas of the European territory
are relatively unaffected by acid deposition. The latter have depositions that do not exceed
critical loads. The 60 per cent abatement constraint will not be binding for them. Countries
like Spain, Greece and Portugal are broadly in this category.
Figure 2: Aggregate zoning on the basis of equivalent ecological sensitivity
x  20
20 < x  40
40 < x  80
80 < x  160
160< x
9. Macro-zoning does not exclude the risk that, in some areas, deposition may increase or may not decrease,
though a significant decrease will be achieved in another part of the same macro-zone. Anyway, the target of a
60 per cent abatement rate of excess over critical loads does not directly refer to damage. In places where critical
loads may be slightly exceeded, the target is the same as in places where the excess is of a greater magnitude.
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Figure 3: Aggregate zoning on the basis of excess acid deposits over critical loads
(1990 data)
y  0
0 < y  20
20 < y  40
40 < y  80
80 < y  160
160< y
4. IMPLEMENTINGA SYSTEM OF TWO SIMULTANEOUS, COUPLED
ALLOWANCE TRADINGMECHANISMS
The trading system has to take into account two basic heterogeneous constraints: national
emission caps and deposition limits in unit zones. Given this, a first possibility is to conceive
of two different systems of trading, one for each constraint, which are coupled together to
allow sources to emit a given amount of SO2. To obtain the right to emit one tonne of SO2, a
source having been involved in emissions trading should possess one allowance of each
type
10
.
10. Plants not involved in emissions trading will just be submitted to the requirements of the emission allowances
they receive from their governments. Additional deposition constraints become actual only when plants begin to
trade. This reflects the view that trading will be politically accepted only if it provides both an economic
improvement (cost abatement) and an environmental improvement.
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With such a system, each source would then operate in two types of allowance market
- one for emissions allowances, working at the EU level and based on initial allocations
distributed by national governments, and one for deposition allowances, focused on the
specific constraints for each deposition zone in Europe (including non EU regions) and based
on initial allocations distributed by the central authorities (the UNECE Secretariat for
example). This system would take account of emissions from sources which belong to the
territory of the EU, but generate acid deposition outside the EU. In the framework of the Oslo
Protocol, the same basic constraints operate whatever the territory involved.
For the market in deposition allowances, I have chosen to explore only one option, the
one in which transactions are only authorised between sources generating deposition within
the same deposition zones
11
. In that case, there will be as many markets of the second type as
there are deposition zones. If there exist n unit zones in Europe, a source would have to
operate on (at most) n + 1 markets (the n deposition zone markets and the EU wide market of
nationally allocated emissions allowances).
In order to couple the two types of allowances, a pollutant transportation model (such
as EMEP
12
) has to be used for translating emissions into deposition or deposition into
emissions. The basic framework for a system of this type is summarised in Table 1 and
Figure 4.
Table 1: A double system of allowances
Emissions allowances Deposition allowances
Units tonnes tonnes of deposition in zone i
Number of
markets
1 Up to n - the number of unit zones
Trading Unconstrained only between sources generating
deposition in the same zones
Allocation national governments (political) central authorities (using EMEP)
11. For example, if plant A has deposition in zones a, b, c, and plant B has deposition in zones b, c, d, then A and
B can trade their respective depositions in zones b and c. But for this trading to be profitable, A will also have to
trade with plant C or D having deposition in zone a, so as to meet all the constraints related to the zones on which
emissions are deposited.
12. EMEP stands for the Co-operative Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long Range Transmission
of Air Pollutants in Europe. This is a subsidiary body to the CLRTAP and provides the official estimates of
pollutant transportation and deposition within Europe.
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Figure 4: A double system of allowances
Emission constraint
Initial allocation of emission
allowances to plant j, based on
national quotas: Pej
Deposition constraint
Actual deposition
x% reduction in the
gap between deposition
and critical loads
EMEP
Reduction rate needed
on zone i
EMEP Pdi
j (allowances to j of emitting on i)
Trading with other plants on n markets
Trading with other plants on one single EUmarket
P'ej
P'di
j
P'dij=P'ej
Financial
balance
Emission
of allowed
pollutants
Deposition constraint
ALLOCATION
This double system of allowance trading may be more practical that it seems at first
sight. In the deposition markets, potential trading partners are more limited in number. They
may be well-known to each potential participant. Thus, the problem of finding potential
partners would be rather easy to overcome. At the same time, the market could be too thin,
making it difficult to find partners ready for an exchange. The possibility of strategic
interference amongst competitors (market power) cannot be avoided either. The importance of
these difficulties may be expected to be proportional to the number of zones. Similarly the
administrative practicality of the scheme is inversely proportional to the number of zones.
These considerations strengthen the argument in favour of a small number of zones of large
geographical area.
When potential traders know their trading opportunities on the deposition markets,
they can adjust their strategy on the market for emissions. The emissions allowance market
provides flexibility regarding the way the initial allocation has been dealt with politically by
governments, although grandfathering is the most probable choice for political reasons, and
provides large opportunities for exchange for suppliers and buyers. No specific additional
constraints are necessary on this market since the deposition constraints are tackled by the
deposition market.
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This heterogeneous combination of two types of allowance can be seen as an incentive
to trade. Participants need sufficient allowances of both types (emission and deposition) to be
able to continue operating. If they have insufficient allowances of one type they must either
buy more or reduce emissions. If they have more allowances of one type than they can use
they have an incentive to sell. In each case, it is more rewarding to engage in trade than to stay
in their present position.
While this scheme is significantly more complicated than, for example, the US Acid
Rain Program, it may still be viable. The complications arise not from the scheme itself but
from the dual constraint embodied in the existing UNECE regime
13
. Since these constraints
are unlikely to be abandoned, it is necessary to devise a scheme that fully incorporates them.
To minimise transaction costs and expand trading opportunities it will be necessary to define
trading zones that are larger than the EMEP unit zones - even if this solution does not provide
an absolute guarantee of environmental improvement for each unit zone.
The following sections describe two variants of an integrated allowance trading
scheme. As in the previous scheme, physical modelling of pollutant transportation and
deposition plays a central role, in both the allocation of allowances and the authorisation of
trades. Proposed trades are tested with physical models for ascertaining their impacts on
deposition for each unit zone. The variants differ as regards the rules for the initial allocation
of allowances and the type of incentive mechanism incorporated to make reaching critical
loads targets more attractive to plants (variant 1) and governments (variant 2).
5. AN INTEGRATED TRADING SYSTEM, WITH AN AUCTIONED
MARKET FOR ‘UNUSABLE ALLOWANCES’
Here, the initial allocation is organised in two steps. First, a potential allocation of ‘emission’ 
allowances to individual sources (plants) by national governments is calculated on the basis of
national ceilings and allocation criteria chosen by those governments. The subsequent
deposition from each source for each deposition zone is then assessed with the help of the
EMEP model. In the meantime, the deposition target is used as the basis for a calculation of
an overall deposition cap for each deposition zone. These zone deposition caps are then
distributed proportionately to the sources responsible for the deposition, also using EMEP.
This gives the potential ‘deposition’ allowances. The two allocations are translated in 
comparable terms (units of emissions) for each source by using the vector that describes how
emissions from a source translate into deposition in the different deposition zones (say 10 per
cent on R1, 30 per cent on R3, 25 per cent on R11, and so on). Each source will have a
different dispersion vector according to its location. At this moment, for each source, two
different amounts of potential allowances are considered, the ‘emission’ one and the one 
derived from ‘deposition’. The lower value of acceptable emissions is then selected, in order 
13 It may be noted here that there are also dual constraints in the US system, but from different origins. Power
stations must comply with both the federal Acid Rain Program and state regulations on local air quality. In this
case, local regulations, for instance in the Mid-West, frequently commanded investments in scrubbers, leaving
important amount of unused allowances available for sale. Symmetrically, after the achievement of such
investments, those utilities were uninterested in purchasing allowances.
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to satisfy the more binding constraint. On this basis an actual quota of allowances is allocated
to the sources. These may be termed usable and tradable allowances. They can either be used
directly, to cover actual emissions of the source, or traded, if sources take measures to abate
their emissions under this quota. Each allowance of one ton of SO2 is then defined as a vector
of deposition in n zones.
At the same time, individual sources (plants) are given an extra amount of potential
allowances responding to the difference between the less binding constraint (the emission or
deposition, it depends on the source location) and the more binding one. This extra amount
cannot be used directly but may be used for trading. These can be termed unusable, tradable
allowances. This extra allocation will supplement the basic entitlement and give an additional
incentive to sources to enter into allowance trading, since they can benefit from trading
opportunities which remain compatible with both constraints of the regime. The operation of
the mechanism could be as follows:
 Just like ‘usable and tradable allowances’, unusable ones are defined as a deposition 
vector for one ton of SO2. Two cases can be considered. Whenever ‘unusable and tradable allowances’ derive from a more binding
emission constraint they can be sold freely but they can only be used by the
buyer for a use touching the same deposition zones in Europe as the ones
that would have been affected if the seller had used them directly. This
means that such transactions have to be checked as regards the deposition
zones affected. For instance, if 100 tonnes of unusable allowances are sold
by a source to another, what is really sold is a deposition right reflecting the
structure of deposition of the seller, say 20 tonnes in Z1, 30 tonnes in Z2, 50
tonnes in Z3. So the entitlement obtained through the purchase of 100
‘unusable deposition allowances’ is a vector D1,2,3 (20, 30, 50). It is possible
that the buyer cannot use the whole spectrum of what it buys, due to its own
different location and different structure of deposition from its emissions. Whenever unusable allowances are related to a non binding emission
constraint, the deposition vector for one ton of SO2 will be zero, limiting the
possible usage of such allowances to the cases when users need to
complement quotas limited by an emission constraint and not a deposition
one. So, the amount of ‘unusable, tradable allowances’ may evolve with time, following 
the various transactions. At any moment, the net amount of ‘usable allowances’ is 
defined by the level of the most binding constraint (emission or deposition), and the
amount of ‘unusable allowances’ can be calculated as the difference between the
two potential allowances (emission and deposition). A financial mechanism could be set up to facilitate the valuation of ‘unusable 
allowances’ on a market. They may feed an auction market organised by the
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authorities on behalf of sources. The revenues raised by the auctions could be
refunded to the source entitled to it
14
. This ‘last resort market’ would be open to any 
source, but the buyers will be subject to the same constraints of usage that were
previously described for all sources.
This system may seem complicated, but once an algorithm has been defined for
making calculations plants should be able to deal with the system. The structure of the system
is summarised in figure 5:
Figure 5: An integrated system with an auctioned secondary market
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With such a system, an auction market for allowances is generated in addition to
bilateral trades. This has the following advantages:
 It gives additional flexibility and safety to sources and avoids the strategic retention
of allowances. The mechanism would be similar to auctions organised by EPA in
14. This is termed a zero revenue auction
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the US; any source looking for allowances and not finding them through bilateral
trade could enter this recourse market. It facilitates the emergence of a public reference price for SO2 allowances, and
allows comparisons to be made between the various national markets. This
compares with bilateral trades which are normally private, with no release of price
information.
In providing a means to make economic use of ‘unusable allowances’ this integrated 
system creates an incentive for most countries and individual sources to accept the constraint
of the percentage critical loads target, since going further than national ceilings would be
compensated for in this way. This may enhance the political acceptability of the regime and
accelerate progress towards the target of respecting critical loads. In contrast, if no opportunity
to benefit from unusable allowances was given, the political and logical coherence of this
integrated solution would be open to question. This is because it would give a strong weight to
the critical loads goal without providing the incentives necessary to achieve this goal.
6. AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM INCORPORATING COMPENSATIONS
FOR STATES
This procedure for the initial allocation reverses the previous solution. One begins by
considering current emissions from sources and simulates, using EMEP, the subsequent
deposition in each basic deposition zone. Two cases are then possible. If the critical loads are
not exceeded, the source is credited with a ‘deposition allowance’ corresponding to its current 
emissions. If the critical loads are exceeded, the current target of a percentage closure of the
gap between deposition and critical loads is used to calculate a deposition cap for the
deposition zone; this cap is allocated proportionately to each source having deposition in the
zone. This defines the first formula for determining the potential SO2 deposition allowances to
be received by each individual source. Consider this example: one source S1 has three tonnes
of deposition on a deposition zone Z1, for which the cap is not exceeded, and eight tonnes of
deposition on Z2 where the cap is exceeded. Then S1 will first receive 3 Pd1. If Z2 is receiving
a total amount of excess deposition of 20 tonnes and responsibility of S1 for this is 5 per cent,
then (assuming a deposition target of 60%) it will also receive:
{8 - [(20 x 60 %) x 5 %]} = 7.4 Pd2.
So the first potential deposition allocation of S1 is: P
1
D = 3 P
1
d1 + 7.4 P
1
d2
Then the total amount, E
D
, of such SO2 allowances given to EU sources is calculated
to test the compatibility of this allocation with the Oslo Protocol, as regards abatement
commitments expressed in national ceilings:
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E
D = i,j Pidj for each source i and zone j
An EU cap on emissions, E
T
, is also calculated as the sum of SO2 emissions
compatible with agreed national ceilings. If E
D
 E
T
, the first allocation is actually
implemented for sources, since it satisfies at the same time the total EU cap and the critical
loads target for each European zone. If on the contrary E
D
> E
T
, some additional restriction is
needed. It can be argued that a proportional reduction on the first formula of allocation of
allowances will be the appropriate solution for every individual source. For instance, if
E
D = 1.2 x ET, the actual initial allocation of S1 will be:
P
1
T = [(3/1.2 Pd1 ; 7.4/1.2 Pd2)] = (2.5 Pd1 ; 6.15 Pd2)
Figure 6: An integrated system with compensations for States
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Such a procedure fits an integrated EU political context, since member countries are
required to transfer their national quotas to the EU, so as to obtain a global EU wide cap. The
prominent role given to the critical loads targets also fits this context. But under what
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conditions will this solution be acceptable to governments? Some countries will certainly see
their actual quota reduced when compared to the agreed national ceilings in the Oslo Protocol
or to the first variant considered above. It seems quite natural to envisage some mechanism of
financial compensation. Governments, not sources, are proposed to be compensated, since
governments have to be convinced to accept additional restrictions.
What basis can be imagined for this compensation? Since the breakthrough of the Oslo
Protocol was only possible because the parties accepted some integrated assessment as a basis
for elaborating an optimal international plan, parties could agree to calculate compensation
using the same tool. The compensations table could then be calculated as the difference in
national costs resulting from two allocations: the agreed national ceilings of the Protocol and
the allocation resulting from the procedure that has been just described.
7. CONCLUSION
The three proposals examined here were specifically conceived to address the two major
constraints by which the institutional context of the EU and UNECE SO2 requirements have
been interpreted: national emission ceilings and deposition constraints for geographical zones.
What can be the future of such proposals, if they are to become reality? Can we imagine an
evolution towards a system of tradable allowances structured by a single constraint, i.e.
deposition allowances?
To achieve an evolution towards a deposition allowance trading scheme, two
conditions need to be met:
 all countries of the EU must abandon their national quotas to a common EU
sovereign body, for redistribution according to some agreed rule (the political
condition); constraints related to deposition allowances should be more binding, in every area,
than the ones related to the emissions allowances (the technical condition).
If, for the sake of discussion, we take the first political condition as met, achievement
of the second one looks rather doubtful. Deposition markets would frequently be the more
binding ones, but this will not always be the case, since all EU countries have caps on their
emissions, but critical loads are not exceeded in significant part of the EU territory. A double
system takes into account different rationales for allocation, which is an attractive property for
achieving socio-political acceptability for the trading regime. Moreover the two types of
allowances do not cover the same territory: emissions allowances, according to the proposed
schemes, would be limited to the EU territory, while deposition allowances will be of concern
for all Europe, including non EU deposition zones which are affected by EU emissions.
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Evolution towards a one-constrained scheme would require a distribution of power in
the EU which is rather different from that at present, where nation states have preserved
significant political autonomy. The political equilibrium reached with the Oslo Protocol may
be redefined in the future. In the meantime, the type of mechanism that has been presented in
this paper does fit well in this framework. Either a double market system or an integrated one
provides the sort of equilibrium needed and may operate for a long time as an intermediate
tool between national approaches, as reflected in national ceilings, and the pure co-operative
European approach reflected in the critical loads reference.
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